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Book Note
BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT, by Tamara Piety1

PATRICK STOTHERS-KWAK
HOW COEXTENSIVE ARE THE rights of a corporation with that of a natural person,

and when did the metaphor of corporate personhood begin to be taken literally?
Tamara Piety forcefully confronts these questions, using the United States
Supreme Court case of Nike Inc v Kasky2 as a framing device. The argument that
emerged in this case—that politically tinged commercial speech is entitled to full
First Amendment protection—is the natural evolution of the Supreme Court’s
controversial holding in Citizens United v Federal Elections Commission,3 in which
corporations were held to stand on equal ground with citizens in their right to
political speech. Countering what she sees as First Amendment jurisprudence
run amok, Piety interrogates the principles underpinning freedom of expression
and forcefully argues against their application to commercial speech.
The book is divided into three parts. Part I lays out the parallel development
of the commercial speech and corporate political speech doctrines while charting
their collision course. Noting that the protection of commercial speech is a
relatively recent phenomenon, Piety discusses the 1976 case of Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,4 in which the Court
held that truthful commercial expression was entitled to limited protection on
the basis of the listener’s right to potentially useful information. Nevertheless, in
the absence of a satisfying definition of what commercial speech is, advocates
1.
2.
3.
4.

(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012) 328 pages.
539 US 654 (2003).
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of corporate political speech, which is entitled to full constitutional protection,
have begun to blur the doctrinal lines. Piety criticizes the merging of political and
commercial speech doctrines, noting their divergent theoretical underpinnings
and the litany of economic regulations that will be subject to attack using this
supercharged First Amendment entitlement. Part I concludes by returning to the
first principles of freedom of expression and the constellation of interests that it was
meant to advance: (1) individual self-fulfillment; (2) attainment of truth; (3) public
participation in the political process; and (4) the maintenance of a balance between
stability and change.5
Part II explores the first set of these interests: individual self-fulfillment
and the attainment of truth. In Emerson’s formulation of the principle,
individual self-fulfillment encompasses notions of autonomy, self-expression,
and self-actualization—interests, Piety argues, that are not advanced by an
untrammelled commercial speech environment in which representations cannot
even be regulated for their truth. Because corporations are simply means to
ends,6 they are not, by definition, autonomous and they cannot self-actualize;
the rights of the listener, therefore, are the appropriate locus of the commercial
speech doctrine. Piety argues that the net effect of manipulative branding efforts
is to actively impede an individual’s struggle for autonomy and fulfillment—to
say nothing of the truth-obfuscating effects of a marketing environment in which
accuracy cannot be regulated—and we are more susceptible to it than we would
like to believe.7
In Part III, Piety engages with the democratic rationales for freedom
of expression, arguing that neither principle advanced by Emerson—public
participation and balancing between stability and change—is furthered by
enhanced protection of commercial speech. Indeed, commercial influence already
distorts the political process, as the corporate form allows for an accumulation
of wealth that amplifies its voice. Moreover, by constraining the ability of
democratically elected bodies to regulate corporate speech, or commerce more
generally, a more protective commercial speech doctrine is anti-democratic and
counter-majoritarian.
5.
6.
7.

Piety borrows this framework from Thomas Emerson. See “Toward a General Theory of the
First Amendment” (1963) 72 Yale LJ 877.
Piety adopts a Kantian view of autonomy, which flows from the idea that human beings are
ends in themselves. See Piety, supra note 1 at 79.
Piety points to recent developments in behavioural economics focusing on the predictably
irrational ways in which humans make decisions. See Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein,
Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Human Happiness (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2008).
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Brandishing the First Amendment smartly returns to the first principles of
freedom of expression, thereby bringing recent doctrinal developments into
stark relief. The tone throughout is polemical, yet Piety avoids the tendency
to characterize corporations as villainous or the evolution of marketing
strategies as conspiratorial. Rather, the author looks past the abstractly logical,
but commonsensically nonsensical premises of Citizens United to the realities
of the modern marketplace of ideas. This is an environment in which the
government gives consumers fewer and fewer tools for parsing sophisticated
marketing strategies and where the consequences of fraudulent proliferations of
misinformation are increasingly grave.

